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Disposition terms, such as 'cowardice,' 'fragility' and 'reactivity,' often appear 
in explanations. Sometimes we explain why a man ran away by saying that he 
was cowardly, or we explain why something broke by saying it was fragile. 
Scientific explanations of certain phenomena feature dispositional properties 
like instability, reactivity, and conductivity. And these look like causal 
explanations - they seem to provide information about the causal history of 
various events. 
Philosophers such as Ned Block, Jaegwon Kim, Elizabeth Prior, Robert 
Pargetter, and Frank Jackson l have suggested reasons for thinking that 
dispositions are causally inert. I call this the "Inert Dispositions View." 
According to this view, the glass's fragility was not responsible for its breaking; 
the man's cowardice was causally impotent as he fled. The Inert Dispositions 
View would call many of the explanations we give into question. By employing 
a disposition in an explanation, we might have thought we were giving a causal 
explanation of the event. Perhaps we took ourselves to be explaining an effect 
with some feature of its cause that was responsible for the effect. However, if 
dispositions are causally inert, we are explaining the event in some other way, 
or not really explaining it at all. 
The Inert Dispositions View suggests that something is amiss with many 
scientific explanations. If properties like conductivity and volatility are causally 
inert, it is not clear how appealing to them provides us with information about 
why certain phenomena occur. This is especially problematic if one thinks, as 
some do, that the fundamental properties that scientists attribute to the ultimate 
1 Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, 'Three Theses About Dispositions'. American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 19 (1982): 251-257; Frank Jackson, 'Mental Causation', Mind, 105 (1996): 377-413; 
'Essentialism, Mental Properties and Causation', Proceedings o/the Aristotelian-Society, 95 
(1995): 253-268; Ned Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World?', in Meaning and Method: 
Essays in Honoro/Hilary Putnam (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); JaegwonKim, 
'Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion', 'The Nonreductivist's Troubles With Mental 
Causation' in Supervenience and Mind (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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constituents of matter - things like force, mass, charge, impenetrability - are 
dispositional. If, as Simon Blackburn says, "science finds only dispositional 
properties all the way down,"2 and if dispositions are causally inert, it would 
seem that science does not provide us with real causal explanations. 
The Inert Dispositions View implies that there is something amiss with 
psychological explanations as well. At least some psychological states are 
dispositional - being courageous or shy, being such that you would accept 
a drink if you were offered one. On some views, all mental states are like 
dispositions, since having a mental state is a matter of having some brain state 
or other that performs a certain causal role. If mental properties are relevantly 
similar to dispositions, and dispositions are inert, then mental properties make 
no difference to what a body does. However, it is natural to think that my 
believing and desiring certain things has much to do with my body moving 
in certain ways. It would take powerful arguments to cast these beliefs into 
serious doubt. 
In this paper, I defend the causal efficacy of dispositions against two types 
of arguments thatl call "Analyticity Arguments" and "No Work Arguments." 
According to Analyticity Arguments, there is an analytic or necessary 
connection between a disposition and its manifestation, and this goes to show 
that there is no causal connection. I argue, on the contrary, that it shows no 
such thing. According to No Work arguments, manifestations of dispositions 
already have sufficient causes, and so there is "no work" for dispositions to do. 
I claim that these arguments rest on some questionable assumptions. 
II. Dispositions 
Proponents of the Inert Dispositions View assume a certain view of dispositions 
that I will adopt for purposes of this paper. A disposition is a property that 
several objects can have in common. (For example, all the glasses in my 
cupboard are fragile, or have fragility.) A disposition can be given a second-
order characterization - a disposition is a property of having some property 
which plays a certain causal role. (A thing is fragile if it has some property 
which makes it such that it will break when struck.) Every disposition has a 
causal basis - a property that is causally efficacious for the manifestation, given 
the circumstances.3 (Glass has a particular sort of molecular bonding which is 
causally efficacious for breaking upon striking.) In sum: 
2 Simon Blackburn, 'Filling in Space'. Analysis, 50 (1990): 255. 
3 As I have argued elsewhere, it is possible that there are "bare dispositions" that have no causal 
bases (Jennifer McKitrick, 'The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions'. Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXVI No.2 (2003): 349-369). However, for the sake 
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and 
To have disposition D to give manifestation M in circumstances C is to 
have some property P which is a causal basis for giving M in C. 
To have a causal basis for giving M in C is to have a property that is 
causally efficacious for Min C. 
Typically, dispositions are multiply realizable. (The causal basis of fragility 
might be one thing in glass, and another in eggshells.) Also, for all that has 
been said, a particular instance of a disposition can have more than one causal 
basis. (If a glass had two properties, either of which would be efficacious for 
breaking when struck, then both are causal bases of the glass's fragility.) 
III. Causa I Efficacy 
Presumably, those who think that dispositions are "inert," "impotent," "causally 
irrelevant," and "inefficacious" believe nonetheless that some properties do 
not suffer from this inadequacy. It is thought that some non-dispositional 
properties have some relation to effects which dispositions lack. This relation 
is characterized in various ways: certain properties make a difference to what 
happens; they explain effects; an event caused what it did "in virtue of' 
instantiating certain properties; they are the causally efficacious properties. For 
example, the surprise party's being sudden and unexpected was efficacious for 
surprising me, but its lasting five hours was irrelevant to my being surprised. 
Causal efficacy is a relation between some of the properties of an event 
and an effect of that event. However, it is also said that properties of objects 
are causally efficacious. For example, if a ball was thrown at a window and 
broke the glass pane, the mass and velocity of the ball was efficacious for the 
breaking, but the color of the ball, and its belonging to little Johnny are not 
relevant. I could recast this talk in terms of properties of events, such as the 
property being a throwing of a ball with a particular mass.4 However, such 
locutions are awkward. For convenience, I call all the properties of an event, 
together with the properties of the objects involved in that event, the "event-
properties." 
Though it is a matter of significant controversy, when philosophers talk 
about causal efficacy, they seem to have something like the following in 
mind: a causally efficacious property is a member of a set of properties which 
of this paper, I am granting that all dispositions have causal bases. 
4 A similar point is made by David Braun, 'Causally Relevant Properties'. Philosophical Per-
spectives, 9 (1995): 449. 
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is minimally sufficient for the occurrence of an effect. Given a set of event-
properties, some subset of properties is causally efficacious for an effect of 
that event. These properties are such that, when instantiated together in this 
fashion, the effect necessarily occurs (or if the world is indeterministic, the 
effect has a certain probability of occurring). This set of causally efficacious 
properties is to be minimal, in that no subset of it would be sufficient for the 
occurrence of the effect. In sum: 
If a property P is causally efficacious for an event e, then 
P is a member of a set of event-properties S which is: 
i) sufficient, given the laws, for e; and 
ii) such that no proper subset of S has this feature. 
This definition is probably incomplete as it stands. One might add such 
qualifications as: there are no inhibiting factors present, or the properties in 
S are natural properties. Despite the likely need for further qualifications, 
this definition helps to flesh out the intuitive idea of causal efficacy that is at 
work in the arguments to follow. However, note that this definition does not 
guarantee that a minimally sufficient set of properties will be unique. The 
mere definition of "causal efficacy" does not rule out the possibility of one 
event instantiating two sets of properties, each of which would be minimally 
sufficient for a certain effect. -
We can now put the Inert Dispositions View more precisely: No disposition is 
a member of a minimal set of properties which is sufficient for the occurrence 
of the manifestation ofthat disposition. Now let's consider the arguments which 
are supposed to convince us that the Inert Dispositions View is correct. 
III. Analyticity Arguments 
According to an Analyticity Argument, there is an analytic relation between a 
disposition and a manifestation, and therefore, there is no causal connection 
between them. Any adequate definition of a disposition will refer to its 
characteristic manifestation. For example, "fragility" is defined by reference 
to breaking or shattering. So, there is a definitional or conceptual connection 
between a disposition term and an event-type - between 'fragility' and breaking, 
for example. "Fragile objects tend to break when struck" is, in some sense, 
analytic. It is further assumed that causal claims are contingent, and not 
analytic. It follows that, if a statement is analytic, it is not a causal statement. 
Consequently, "The glass broke because it was fragile" cannot be a causal 
claim, and so fragility must be causally inert. 
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Analyticity arguments have long been disputed. As Donald Davidson points 
out, how events are described, what names they are given, neither determines 
nor precludes causal connections between them . 
.. .there is something very odd in the idea that causal relations are 
empirical rather than logical. What can this mean? Surely not that 
every true causal statement is empirical. For suppose 'A caused B' is 
true. Then the cause ofB = A; so substituting, we have 'The cause of 
B caused B' , which is analytic. The truth of a causal statement depends 
on what events are described; its status as analytic or synthetic depends 
on how the events are described. 5 
Causal connections between events hold independently of our descriptions of 
them. The same can be said of properties. A property can be picked out via its 
efficacy for some effect. Consider the claim "The property that was causally 
efficacious for e was causally efficacious for e." The statement is analytic, but 
that should not lead us to think that the property that was causally efficacious 
for e was not causally efficacious for e! 
However, these observations have not put an end to Analyticity Arguments. 
According to a more modest Analyticity Argument, our sense that the disposition 
is relevant to the manifestation is explained by the analytic connection, and 
this leaves us with no reason to suppose a causal connection holds. Absent a 
reason to suppose a causal connection holds, presumably we should assume 
one is absent. This is what Block suggests when he writes: 
The fact that dormitivity is sufficient for sleep is perfectly intelligible in 
terms of this logical relation. What reason is there to suppose that there 
must also be a nomological relation between dormitivity and sleep?6 
Block's rhetorical question suggests that there is no reason to suppose there is a 
causal connection between dormitivity and sleep, in addition to the logical one. 
The logical, or analytic relation between 'dormitivity' and 'sleep' fully explains 
(i.e. renders "perfectly intelligible") the fact that donnitivity is sufficient for 
sleep. Since we have a full explanation, we need not, and indeed should not, look 
any further. (Interestingly, this analyticity argument appeals to some principle 
of explanatory exclusion, which will be discussed at length later.) 
In response, pointing out one reason that something is relevant does not 
show that that is the only reason. Donnitivity might be relevant to sleep both 
5 Donald Davidson: Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 14. 
6 Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World?', p. 157. 
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conceptually and causally. We have additional reasons for supposing that causal 
connections hold between dispositions and events, especially when we think 
about mental properties as dispositions. Even if our language and explanatory 
practices did not give us reasons for supposing that there is a causal connection 
between dormitivity and sleep, there might nevertheless be one. Furthermore, 
our language and explanatory practices do give us reasons to suppose causal 
connections exist. Our descriptions of events seem to track causal connections. 
Examples of this are familiar: sunburn is caused by excessive exposure to 
sunlight; lethal injections and fatal accidents cause death. The existence of 
conceptual connections between our descriptions of events seems to support 
the idea that these events are causally connected. A similar point can be made 
about predicates tracking causally relevant properties. 
IV. Hume's Principle 
One might still be troubled by the thought that the connection between a 
disposition and its manifestation is too "tight" for there to be a causal relation as 
well. Frank Jackson claims that there is a metaphysically necessary connection 
between a disposition and its manifestation that is incompatible with a causal 
connection. According to Jackson, saying that fragility causes glass to break 
is to violate Hume's Principle about the contingency of causal connections.7 
According to Jackson, a thing's causal powers are accidental properties, which 
depend on what world it is in, and which laws obtain. So, if two states have a 
necessary connection, they cannot be causally connected as well. According 
to Jackson, to allow that fragility causes breaking upon dropping -
would be to allow that there are properties that have causal powers 
essentially: in every world the property of having the property or 
properties responsible for breaking on dropping in that world is 
possessed only by objects which are such that were they dropped they 
would break. There is no way that the second-order property can be 
instantiated without the relevant causal power being instantiated. So, 
if we are to respect Hume's insight, we must deny that fragility itself 
does the causing of the breaking ... 8 
The key premise of Jackson's argument is what he calls Hume's Principle, 
which can be put as follows: 
7 Jackson, 'Essentialism ... ', p. 257. 
8 Jackson, 'Essentialism ... ', p. 257. 
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If events with event-property P cause events of kind K, they do so con-
tingently; there is a possible world in which P-events occur, but do not 
cause K -events. 
While Jackson doesn't provide an argument for this premise, perhaps it is 
supposed to be intuitively plausible. But is it? Consider the property of being 
negatively charged. If negative charge is causally efficacious for repelling 
negatively charged particles, according to Hume's Principle, this should be 
a contingent fact about negative charge - there should be a possible world 
in which a thing has negative charge, but is not disposed to repel negatively 
charged particles. Accordingly, there would be a possible world in which 
negatively charged particles come close to each other, but are not repelled, 
other things being equal. It is not at all obvious that such a world is possible 
- it seems inconsistent with the meaning of "negatively charged." On the other 
hand, Jackson might say that negative charge is inert with respect to repelling 
negatively charged particles. That option also strikes me as counter-intuitive. 
Negative charge seems to be both conceptually and causally connected to the 
repulsion of negatively charged particles. 
It is worth noting that Hume's Principle is hardly common ground among 
philosophers. Robert Stalnaker, for example, claims that there are certain 
properties, such as mass, charge, or impenetrability, that cannot be "separated, 
conceptually, from the laws in which they occur and from the causal powers 
they confer on objects that instantiate them.,,9 On Sydney Shoemaker's view, 
what determines the identity of a property "is its potential for contributing to 
the causal powers of things that have it. "10 According to Shoemaker, every 
property has its causal powers essentially. So, if we decline to "respect Hume's 
insight," we are not alone. 
In sum, neither the straightforward Analyticity Argument, nor Jackson's 
appeal to Hume's Principle, succeed in showing that dispositions are causally 
inert. Now, let's tum to a different argumentative strategy of the Inert 
Dispositions View - the No Work Argument. 
v. The No Work Argument 
No Work Arguments are familiar in the literature on mental causation. Consider 
9 Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 160. 
10 Shoemaker, 'Causality and Properties', in Time and Cause, ed. P. van Inwagen (Dordecht: 
Reidel, 1980), pp. 109-35. 
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mental property M and physical property P, which are candidates for being 
causally efficacious with respect to a brain event with mental property M* and 
physical property P*. Kim argues that M has no causal powers of its own: 
P is doing all the causal work, and M's causation ofP*, or ofM* turns 
out to be derivative from P's causal powers. Thus, M has no causal 
powers over and beyond those of P ... II 
Regarding the causal efficacy of semantic properties, Block writes: 
It seems that our cognitive processes exploit a correlation between 
the semantic and the syntactic. The syntactic properties of the 
representation do the causal work, and the semantic properties come 
along for the ride. 12 
Similarly, Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson (hereafter PPJ) support the Inert 
Dispositions View with a No Work argument. They write that since the causal 
basis and the circumstances of manifestation are sufficient for the manifestation, 
"there is nothing left for any other properties of the object to dO.,,13 
The relevant similarity among mental properties, semantic properties, and 
dispositions is that they are all, on these accounts, second-order properties. 
The base (or realizer) properties are causally efficacious for a certain event, 
and this excludes the second-order property from being causally efficacious as 
well. The circumstances of manifestation and the base properties are sufficient 
for the manifestation, and unless there's overdetermination, all other properties 
are inert. 
PPJ's argument from "Three Theses about Dispositions" is typical of No 
Work arguments. 14 It can be summarized as follows: 
1) Every disposition has a causal basis. 
2) The Distinctness Thesis: Causal bases are distinct from their attendant 
dispositions. 
3) Given the circumstances of manifestation, a causal basis is sufficient 
for the manifestation of the disposition. 
4) The Exclusion Principle: If the instantiation of a set of properties is 
sufficient to bring about a certain effect, then all other properties are 
II Kim, 'Nonreductivist Troubles with Mental Causation'. Supervenience and Mind, p. 353. 
12 Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World', p. 145. 
13 PPJ, 'Three Theses About Dispositions', p. 255. 
14 PPJ, 'Three Theses About Dispositions', p. 255. 
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causally inefficacious with respect to that effect. 
Therefore, 
5) Dispositions are causally inefficacious. 
I grant premise (1) since it follows from our working definition of "disposition. ,,15 
I also grant premise (3) for the sake of argument. 16 This leaves two principle 
ways of attacking the No Work argument - by denying The Distinctness Thesis 
(premise 2), or by denying The Exclusion Principle (premise 4). First, I will 
consider denying The Distinctness Thesis, and raise some difficulties for 
that approach. I then pursue my favored strategy, challenging The Exclusion 
Principle. 
VI. Denying Distinctness 
According to the Distinctness Thesis, a disposition is distinct from its causal 
basis. To deny this thesis is to identify a disposition with its causal basis. This 
would solve the problem of "dispositional causation" and refute the Inert 
Dispositions View. If the causal basis is causally efficacious, and the disposition 
is the causal basis, then the disposition is causally efficacious. 17 
The fact that dispositions can be multiply realized poses a difficulty for this 
approach. A disposition can have different causal bases in different objects. 
Crystal, porcelain, and egg shells are all fragile, and presumably they have 
different micro-structural properties that account for this. So, it seems that 
you cannot identify a disposition with its causal basis in every instance. For 
example, you cannot say both that fragility is identical to molecular bonding 
P and that fragility is identical to crystalline structure Q, because P and Q are 
distinct. 
15 Recall: x has disposition D to give manifestation M in circumstances C iff x has some property 
P which is a causal basis for giving M in C. 
16 PPJ define causal basis as the properties of the disposed object that would be sufficient for 
the manifestation in the circumstances ('Three Theses About Dispositions', p. 251), and so 
premise (3) follows. We could contest this way of defining "causal basis," but PPJ's argument 
could be restated easily enough. (Consider a set of x's properties that are sufficient for M in 
C. Call it S. etc.) 
17 This may seem to be at odds with the second-order characterization of dispositions. If a dis-
position is a second-order property, how could it be identical to its first-order realizer? However, 
I'm assuming that if a property P has the same extension as a property Q, then P and Q are the 
same property. So, the property of having property P=property P, since they necessarily have 
the same extension. 
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VII. The Disjunctive Solution 
One way to respond to this problem is to suggest that a disposition is identical 
to a disjunction of its realizers. Consider a case where there are only two 
realizers of fragility, P and Q. According to this Disjunctive Solution, being 
fragile is identified with having (P v Q). The causal efficacy of fragility is just 
that ofP or Q. 
It may seem as though identifying a disposition with a disjunction of its causal 
bases is not to deny the Distinctness Thesis at all. Even if a disposition is a 
disjunction of its various causal bases, that is not to say that the disposition is 
identical to any particular causal basis. So, if the causal basis of fragility were 
P in some instances, and Q in others, even if fragility is identical to (P v Q), it 
still wouldn't be identical to P, nor identical to Q. 
However, perhaps a given instance of a disposition can have more than one 
causal basis. A particular instance of fragility might have P as a causal basis, 
and (P v Q) as another causal basis. The disjunction of various causal bases 
could itself be a causal basis, and that causal basis would be identical to the 
disposition, on this view. 
Notice, however, that this approach to attacking the No Work Argument 
will run afoul of the Exclusion Principle. It seems that there would be a set of 
properties which included P, but excluded (P v Q) which would be sufficient 
for breaking. IfP is responsible for the breaking, as far as the properties of the 
glass are concerned, what is the role ofthe disjunctive property (P v Q)? If the 
property (P v Q) were also causally efficacious, it would seem to overdetermine 
the breaking. Ifwe accept the Exclusion Principle, we cannot say that both (P v 
Q) and P are efficacious with respect to breaking. So, in order for the Disjunctive 
Solution to succeed, it will have to be coupled with an argument against the 
Exclusion Principle, such as the one I will offer in the next section. 
There are other reasons for doubting the Disjunctive Solution, irrespective 
of the Exclusion Principle. Disjunctive properties are suspect. Lewis says that 
a disposition "unlike the various bases, is too disjunctive and too extrinsic to 
occupy any causal role.,,18 Likewise, Kim says: 
the first-order realizing properties are extremely diverse and 
heterogeneous, so much so that their disjunctions cannot be considered 
well-behaved properties with the kind of systematic unity required for 
propertyhood. 19 
18 Lewis, 'Causal Explanation', in Philosophical Papers. Volume 2. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1983), p. 224. 
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If this is right, and dispositions are disjunctive properties, then the problem is 
not that there is no causal work for dispositions to do once the base properties 
do their job; it is that dispositions are not the kinds of properties that are capable 
of doing any causal work at all. 
Kim and Lewis seem to be claiming that a property such as (P v Q) cannot 
be eligible for any causal or nomic role, simply by virtue of being a disjunctive 
property. In order to assess these claims, we must clarify the nature of disjunctive 
properties. Intuitively, if P is a property and Q is a property, the disjunction 
ofP and Q will be a disjunctive property. But consider the case where P is the 
property being a female cat, and Q is the property being a male cat. If all cats 
are male or female, then being a female cat or a male cat is the same property 
as being a cat, which does not seem like a disjunctive property. Being named 
by a disjunctive predicate does not make a property disjunctive in the relevant 
sense. (We could make up disjunctive names for any property, e.g., being blue 
is being blue and square or being blue and not square.) To call a property 
"disjunctive" is to say that the things which have this property do not form a 
natural class. Disjunctive properties are unnatural properties. 
The problem with drawing conclusions about properties from predicates 
is that, in natural languages, the distinction between simple and disjunctive 
predicates does not line up neatly with the distinction between natural and 
unnatural properties. But imagine a language L. In L, all natural properties 
are named by simple predicates. However, if a disjunctive predicate refers to 
a property P in L, it wouldn't follow that P was unnatural. Possibly, a simple 
predicate could also refer to P. One might think that this is impossible, because 
the disjunction of two natural properties is always a less natural property. 
However, this view is mistaken. Naturalness in not an all or nothing thing, but 
rather a matter of degree. So, the disjunction of two properties might tum out 
to be a more natural property, or at least natural enough to play some causal 
role. 
Even if dispositions can be characterized in disjunctive terms, they might 
still be natural properties. If a disposition D is a property of having some 
property or other that fills causal role R, even if D is multiply realizable, all 
the properties that realize D will have at least one thing in common - they fill 
causal role R. IfP and Q both realize D, they play the same causal role. Recall 
that Shoemaker says that properties can be classified by their causal roles. In 
a similar vein, Kim says: 
19 Kim, Philosophy of Mind (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press 1996), p. 117. 
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kinds in science are individuated on the basis of causal powers; 
that is, to be recognized as a useful property in a scientific theory, a 
property must possess (or be) a determinate set of causal powers. To 
put it another way, the resemblance that defines kinds in science is 
primarily causal/nomological resemblance: Things that are similar in 
causal powers and play similar roles in laws are classified as falling 
under the same kind. 20 
On such an account, P and Q would seem to be the same kind. If they are of 
the same kind, their disjunction is not diverse and heterogeneous. Maybe P and 
Q can play other causal roles, and this fact can serve to differentiate them. But 
that does not show that they are of different kinds. Things of the same kind 
need not be qualitatively identical in every respect. 
Think of the role of alleviating pain in humans. There are a number of 
chemicals that fill that role that have different constituents and different 
structures. However, by filling that role, many of them are considered to be 
of a kind - opiates.2l For one reason or another, these various natural and 
synthetic molecules bind to opiate receptors in the brain. The class of opiates 
does not seem to be a heterogeneous, gerrymandered group. We are justified 
in classifying them as the same kind because they have similar effects. 
It is important to point out that disjunctive predicates can sometimes refer 
to natural, causally efficacious properties. However, this approach to saving 
the causal efficacy of dispositions has its limitations. While this approach may 
work for some dispositions, like the disposition to relieve pain in humans, it 
seems less plausible in other cases. Think of provocativeness - the disposition 
to elicit an aggressive response. Something can elicit an aggressive response 
in an animal, suppose, if it is a certain color, if it has a certain odor, or if it is 
moving in a certain way. But it is hard to believe that a disjunctive property 
like (being red or oscillating or smelling like blood) is a natural property that 
is apt for figuring in causal laws. 
One response is to say that some disposition terms refer to natural properties, 
while others do not. Perhaps terms like' provocative' are merely terms we use 
20 Kim, Philosophy of Mind, p. 119. 
21 "The term 'opioid' has been adopted as a general classification of all of those agents that share 
chemical structures, sites, and mechanisms of action with the endogenous opioid agonists. Opioid 
substances encompass all of the natural and synthetic chemical compounds closely related to 
morphine, whether they act as agonists or antagonists." (http://www.britannica.com/bcom/eb/ 
article/6/0,5716,1 08956+ 15+ 1 06187,00.html?query=opiates) 
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to make causal generalizations about objects which are not intrinsically similar 
in any relevant respect. But another disposition could be a natural property 
if all of its realizer properties formed a natural class. By this strategy, one 
would not support the causal efficacy of every property we have been calling 
'dispositional,' but only the dispositions which are plausibly natural properties. 
Perhaps there are other moves that the proponent of the Disjunctive Solution 
could make, but if he takes this route, he winds up with a somewhat qualified 
defense of the Efficacious Dispositions View. Without further investigation, 
and without some guide as to how to determine the naturalness of a property, 
it is not clear which dispositions would come out causally efficacious on this 
approach. While others may pursue this strategy further, I will tum my attention 
to a different response to the Distinctness Thesis. 
VIII. The Trope Solution 
Cynthia and Graham MacDonald, among others, appeal to the idea of tropes 
in order to respond to the No Work Argument. 22 The view can be summarized 
as follows. While the Distinctness Thesis applies at the level of properties, 
understood as classes or universals, it does not apply at the level of property 
instances, or tropes. So, a property instance of a disposition is identical to a 
property instance of a base property. Furthermore, particular property instances 
are causally efficacious for events. So, it is not a problem if fragility is not 
causally efficacious for breaking, since particular havings of fragility are. Let 
me explain in more detail. 
Redness is something shared by all red things. The redness of the apple on 
my desk is a particular instantiation of redness, also called a red trope. Suppose 
that the apple is a particular shade of red, say russet. Red and russet stand in the 
relation of determinable to determinate. Now, this apple's "russetness" bears a 
relation to its redness that it does not bear to, say, its roundness. One might say 
22 Graham and Cynthia MacDonald, 'Mental Causation and Explanation of Action', in Mind, 
Causation and Action, ed. L Steveson, R. Squires and J. Haldane (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), p. 38. See also Douglas Ehring, 'Mental Causation, Determinables and Property Instances' . 
No us , 30 (1996): 461-80. The target ofthis attack is epiphenomenalism about mental properties; 
however, the same arguments can be applied to dispositions. 
23 Incidentally, I do not share the intuition that the apple's redness is identical to its russetness. 
I could pick the apple out of a barrel of crimson apples because of its russetness (not its red-
ness). The apple might change its shade as it ripens, losing its russetness, but not its redness. 
These considerations are perhaps not decisive, but further discussion of them would take us 
too far afield. 
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that the apple's redness is nothing "over and above" its russetness. Redness and 
russetness are two different properties, having different extensions. However, 
on this view, this apple's russetness is the same thing as its redness. Its red 
trope is identical to its russet trope.23 In the same way, it is thought, a particular 
glass's fragility is the same thing as its crystalline structure. Its crystalline 
structure is its particular way of being fragile, just as the apple's russetness 
is its particular way of being red. This is to deny the Distinctness Thesis for 
tropes - a disposition trope is not distinct from its causal basis trope. 
A key to this strategy is the claim that causal efficacy is a relation between 
a trope and an event, rather than a property and an event. Couple this with the 
claim that one trope is an instance of a determinate and its determinables, and 
this view is subject to a serious difficulty, which can be brought out by certain 
counterexamples. 
To adapt an example from Stephen Yablo,24 suppose you are shipping 
packages, and you are constrained by a 20 pound weight limit. You have a 
crude scale that will only tell you if your package is over 20 pounds. So, you put 
a package on the scale which happens to weigh 21 pounds. The scale indicates 
that the package is over the weight limit. Now, it seems that weighing 21 pounds 
was causally efficacious for tipping the scale. Since tropes of determinables 
are identical to tropes of their determinates, the package's weighing over 20 
pounds is the same trope as its weighing 21 pounds. And since the package's 
weighing 21 pounds was efficacious, and its weighing 21 pounds is identical 
to its weighing over 20 pounds, its weighing over 20 pounds was causally 
efficacious. So far, so good. 
The problems arise when we note that weighing 21 pounds is also a 
determinate of other determinables, such as weighing less than 30 pounds. It 
follows that the package's weighing less than 30 pounds trope is also identical 
to its weighing 21 pounds trope. By the transitivity of identity, the package's 
weighing less than 30 pounds is identical to its weighing over 20 pounds. 
Furthermore, it follows that the package's weighing less than 30 pounds was 
causally efficacious for tipping the scale, as was its weighing an odd number 
of pounds. We can generate infinitely many causal efficacy claims along these 
lines, most of them wildly counter-intuitive. 
What's worse is that, on this view, we lose the sense that it is in virtue of 
instantiating a certain property that an event has the effect that it does. Some 
philosophers think that to be causally efficacious, a property must be apt to 
24 Stephen Yablo, 'Mental Causation'. The Philosophical Review, 101 (1992): 259 (footnote 
32). 
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figure in causal laws. But tropes, being particulars, are not apt for this role, and 
they provide us with no way of generalizing from a particular causal claim. 
Assuming regularity of the laws, if an instance of a property was causally 
efficacious for a certain effect in a certain circumstance, that should give 
us some reason to think that an instance of the same property in a similar 
circumstance will be similarly efficacious. However, if we are inclined to 
think that a weighing less than 30 pounds trope was causally efficacious for 
tipping the scale in a particular instance, we would be mistaken in concluding 
that further instantiations of weighing less than 30 pounds will be causally 
efficacious for tipping the scale. One might think that causal efficacy claims 
should support counterfactuals, but if causal efficacy claims are claims about 
tropes, they will not. 
One might try to avoid these problematic implications in a couple of 
ways. One way is to distinguish tropes of determinables from tropes of their 
determinates. One would avoid saying that the package's weighing less than 
30 pounds is identical to its weighing over 20 pounds. One would also avoid 
having to say that weighing less than 30 pounds is causally efficacious for 
tipping the scale. But one would avoid these problems at a significant cost. 
Identifying tropes of determinables with tropes of determinates is a key part of 
the Trope Solution. To distinguish them would be to embrace the Distinctness 
Thesis for tropes. That would be to say that a disposition trope is distinct from 
its causal basis trope. While this might be a plausible view for independent 
reasons, it has no place in this challenge to the No Work argument. 
Another approach is to say that the trope is causally efficacious in virtue of 
being a trope of a particular property. So, the package's trope tips the scale 
in virtue of being a trope of the property weighing over 20 pounds, but not in 
virtue of being a trope of the property weighing less than 30 pounds. However, 
now we are back to talking about properties, and our introduction of tropes 
has not advanced our argument. For these reasons, I am inclined to stick with 
thinking of properties, rather than tropes, as the relata of causal efficacy. 
In sum, I have considered two approaches to denying the Distinctness Thesis, 
the second premise of the No Work argument. One is the Disjunctive Solution, 
according to which a disposition is identical to a disjunction of its realizers. 
The other is the Trope Solution, according to which instances of a disposition 
are identical to instances of its realizers. I think that both of these approaches 
face difficulties, though perhaps they are not insurmountable. Now I turn my 
attention to the fourth premise of the No Work argument - the Exclusion 
Principle. 
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IX. The Exclusion Principle 
As we have seen, even if we deny the Distinctness Thesis via the Disjunctive 
Solution, we still need to deny the Exclusion Principle. According to the 
Exclusion Principle: 
If the instantiation of a set of properties is sufficient to bring about a 
certain effect, then all other properties are causally inefficacious with 
respect to that effect. 
Suppose a particular causal basis and the properties of the circumstances of 
manifestation are sufficient for the manifestation. It would follow from the 
Exclusion Principle that a disjunction of causal bases (i.e., the disposition, 
according to the Disjunctive Solution) would be inert. If denying the 
Distinctness Thesis requires the Disjunctive Solution and a denial of the 
Exclusion Principle, but denying the Exclusion Principle is sufficient to defeat 
the No Work argument, then we might as well go straight for the Exclusion 
Principle. Even if we are inclined to accept the Distinctness Thesis, we can 
still attack the No Work Argument by denying the Exclusion Principle. 
Kim says: 
The general principle of explanatory exclusion states that two or more 
complete and independent explanations of the same phenomenon 
cannot coexist. 25 
PP J succinctly echo "a complete causal explanation excludes competitors. "26 
PPJ and Kim seem to be making a claim about explanation, which is not 
obviously about properties. However, the Exclusion Principle is used to draw 
conclusions about which properties are causally efficacious. I take it that this 
principle has metaphysical import. The formulation I give above is stated 
in terms of properties, and I assume it is at least a corollary of the principle 
articulated by Kim and PPJ. 
Proponents of the Exclusion Principle say that to deny it is to allow for 
spurious over-determination. Denying the Exclusion Principle amounts to 
saying that both the causal basis and the disposition are each sufficient for the 
effect, given the circumstances of manifestation. If this happened every time 
any disposition is manifest, we would have, as Block says, "bizarre, systematic 
over-determination. "27 
25 Kim, 'Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion', in Supervenience and Mind, p. 
250. 
26 'Three Theses About Dispositions', p. 225. 
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Standardly, an event e is causally overdetennined if two or more distinct 
events occur, each of which is sufficient to cause e. Admittedly, there is 
something wrong with postulating too many coincidences. And if a great many 
effects systematically had two distinct events that were sufficient for causing 
them, that would run counter to our understanding of the causal structure of 
the world. Maybe that would be too high a price to pay for saving the causal 
efficacy of dispositions. 
However, one should not overlook the fact that these considerations 
and intuitions about overdetermination apply to two (or more) events 
overdetennining an effect. But what we are concerned with in the case of 
dispositions and causal bases are the properties of a single event (or of a single 
object involved in an event). But it is not clear what it means to sayan effect 
is overdetennined by an object's properties. Perhaps it would be to say that 
there are two different sets of properties, both of which are such that their 
instantiations are sufficient for a certain type of effect. 
Is this kind of "overdetennination" so worrisome? Most events instantiate a 
huge number of properties, many of which bear logical or nomological relations 
to one-another. A property is causally efficacious if it is a member of a set of 
event-properties S that is minimally sufficient for a certain effect. But there 
is no guarantee that, for any event, there is a unique set S. It seems that any 
time an event is caused, the cause instantiates several sets of properties, each 
of which is sufficient for the effect. One can "carve things up" in a number 
of ways, depending on one's interests or purposes. Suppose redness were a 
member of a set of properties that was sufficient for provoking a bull. It seems 
that there would be another set of properties, that included crimson instead, 
that would also be sufficient. 
The Exclusion Principle asks us to single out one special set of event-
properties that are minimally sufficient for an effect, and declare the rest 
causally inert. This may prove difficult to do, especially when properties are 
so intimately related, as a disposition is to its causal basis. Furthennore, it is 
not clear that we have any compelling reason to suppose that, for any effect, 
there is only one minimally sufficient set of causally efficacious properties. 
Imagine how the Exclusion Principle would work in practice. Let us make 
the following suppositions: 
An event occurs, which involves an object o. 
27 Block, 'Can the Mind Change the World?', p. 159. 
o has property F. 
F is causally efficacious for some event e. 
o has G, and G differs from F. 
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We are wondering whether G is causally efficacious for e. 0 's having one 
property can necessitate or entail that it has another property. Suppose that 
o's having F entails that 0 has G. It follows from the Exclusion Principle that 
G is causally inert with respect to e. A set of properties which included F and 
excluded G would be sufficient for e, and so a set of properties which included 
both F and G would not be a minimally sufficient set, which is what is required 
for causal efficacy. Conversely, if 0 's having G entails that 0 has F, we know 
that G is not causally efficacious, for if it were, by the same reasoning as above, 
then F would not be, and by stipulation, it is. 
So, according to the Exclusion Principle, if a set of properties is causally 
efficacious for a given effect, all properties which entail them and all properties 
which are entailed by them are causally inert.28 This implication seems counter-
intuitive. Consider the following propositions: 
The cape has surface reflectance property R. 
The cape is red21 . 
The cape is crimson. 
The cape is red. 
The cape is colored.29 
Now, suppose that each proposition entails its successor. If one of the above 
properties is causally efficacious for a certain effect, it follows that all of the 
others are causally inert with respect to that effect. How do we decide which 
property is the efficacious one? It is not clear how to answer, and this does 
not seem to be just an epistemic problem. It is not clear what would determine 
the level of specificity at which the causal action is going on. One might 
assume that all of the causal action happens at the most fundamental level. 
But what is the basis of that assumption? Such an assumption has serious 
counter-intuitive consequences, for example, that all of the macro-properties 
we regularly observe are causally impotent. Furthermore, assuming that all 
28 Properly speaking, propositions about properties entail or are entailed. 
29 This expands on a point made by Stephen Yablo, 'Mental Causation', p. 257. 
128 A defense of the causal efficacy of dispositions 
causal action happens at the level of fundamental properties may not serve the 
Inert Dispositions View; it is not at all obvious that the fundamental properties 
are wholly non-dispositional. Strawson, for example, claims: 
It seems that our search for the properties of the categorical base 
must finally lead us to the undeniably theoretical properties which 
physics assigns to the ultimate constituents of matter - perhaps force, 
mass, impenetrability, electric charge. But these properties seem to be 
thoroughly dispositional in character ... 30 
The implausibility of the Exclusion Principle in practice may be better 
illustrated by returning to the example of the scale. Recall that our scale will 
tell you if your package is over 20 pounds, and your package is, in fact, 21 
pounds. The scale indicates that the package is over the weight limit. Now, 
what property of the package was causally efficacious for tipping the scale? 
Was it the property of weighing 21 pounds, or the property of weighing over 
20 pounds? If it was the property of weighing 21 pounds, does that mean that 
the property of weighing over 20 pounds was causally impotent? 
Intuitively, it seems not. Either weighing 21 pounds or weighing over 20 
pounds could be causally efficacious. The causal efficacy of one property 
does not preclude the other property from being causally efficacious as well. 
Either could be a member of a minimally sufficient set of properties. The fact 
that we already have a sufficient set of properties is not a sufficient reason for 
declaring a property outside of this set inert. 
The worry that we are going to end up with too many causally efficacious 
properties is an unfounded one. We might want to limit the number of events 
that we consider sufficient to cause a given effect. However, the drive to put a 
cap on causally efficacious properties is unmotivated. This is especially true 
when the properties in question have some logical or law-like connection. 
There are many ways to describe an event, many properties of the event we 
can cite, different levels of specificity that we can appeal to. Our choice of 
descriptions, predicates, and details is detennined by epistemic and pragmatic 
considerations, but they are no less legitimate or real for that. 
In the preface to Supervenience and Mind, Kim writes 
.. .I am now inclined to think that ontological schemes are by and large 
optional, and that the main considerations that should govern the choice 
30 'Reply to Evans' , in Philosophical Subjects, ed. Zak van Straaten (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980), p. 280. 
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of an ontology are those of utility, simplicity, elegance, and the like. 
Concerning such questions as whether there 'really are' events (over 
and beyond substances and their properties) ... it just seems wrong-
headed to think that there are 'true' answers, answers that are true 
because they correctly depict some pre-existing metaphysical order of 
the world. I think that the heart of ontological inquiry is construction 
rather than description. 31 
This pragmatic or conventionalist approach to metaphysics is at odds with 
clinging to the Exclusion Principle at all costs. The ontological picture of the 
No Work Argument is one in which only one set of fundamental properties is, 
in fact, causally efficacious for a particular event. All the rest are inert. We may 
talk as if these other properties are causally efficacious, but this is not strictly 
speaking so. If anything, they piggy-back on the really efficacious properties. 
But if we are going to construct an ontology, why not construct one that makes 
sense of our explanatory practices and deep commitments, such as the causal 
efficacy of mental properties? Instead of the ontology of exclusion, we could 
develop one of inclusion, allowing a plurality of adequate explanations, and 
multiple, overlapping sets of properties, any of which are candidates for telling 
the causal story. 
X. Conclusion 
As mentioned at the outset, the idea that dispositions are causally efficacious 
is a background assumption of many of our explanatory practices, including 
ordinary, day-to-day explanations, psychological explanations, and scientific 
explanations. Perhaps it is even an assumption behind our conception of 
ourselves as agents. Absent good arguments to the contrary, we should not 
relinquish the view that dispositions are causally efficacious. 
I have tried to show that we do not have good arguments to the contrary. The 
Inert Dispositions View is supported primarily by Analyticity Arguments and No 
Work Arguments, and both have significant weaknesses. Analyticity Arguments 
fail because conceptual connections do not preclude causal connections, and 
Hume's Principle is unsupported. No Work arguments employ two controversial 
premises, the Distinctness Thesis, and the Exclusion Principle. If a disposition 
is a disjunction of its causal bases, or if a disposition trope is a causal basis 
trope, then the Distinctness Thesis is false. If, as I suspect, there is no privileged 
31 Supervenience and Mind, p. ix. 
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explanation nor any special set of properties which preclude all other properties 
from playing a role in the causal story, then the Exclusion Principle is false. 
Undermining our explanatory practices and our belief in mental causation 
would require more powerful arguments than these. 
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